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Abstract In continuing news, there is a growing 
debate on whether current laws and regulations, both 
in the US and abroad, need to be strengthened as they 
relate to nanotechnology. On one side, experts argue 
that nanomaterials, which are making their way into 
the marketplace today, are possibly harmful to 
consumers and the environment, so stronger and 
new laws are needed to ensure they are safe. On the 
other side, different experts argue that more regulation 
will slow down the pace of business and innovation in 
nanotechnology, or that self-regulation is the answer, 
or other opposing positions. This paper will draw out 
the core issues behind the debate and explain that 
there is more at stake than merely environmental, 
health and safety (EHS) worries or business interests, 
as it first appears. We will also suggest an alternative 
solution to stricter laws, since stricter laws would face 
formidable practical challenges, even if they are 
warranted. 
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Whether or not current laws and regulations can 
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P. Lin (*)
 
The Nanoethics Group,
 
Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA, USA
 
e-mail: patrick@nanoethics.org
 
researchers as well as legislators are still trying to 
understand – is a fierce debate that came to the 
forefront last year with the January 2006 report by the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 
(WWICS) that argued for stricter policies in the US 
[1]. This paper will help make the debate more 
understandable by laying out the major positions as 
well as suggesting a simpler, more politically-feasible 
alternative to stricter laws [2]. 
While the aforementioned report dealt exclusively 
with US laws, the underlying debate is parallel to 
ongoing investigations around the world; the concern 
is the same. Because this paper does not refer to any 
particular law or regulation, our discussion here can 
be applied equally well to those investigations outside 
the US. 
Finally, the risks we address here are environmen­
tal, health and safety (EHS) risks as opposed to, e.g., 
the risk that there is no democratic control over the 
technologies, which does not appear as urgent as EHS 
risks but nonetheless is an entirely separate issue 
deserving of its own investigation [3]. 
The Stricter-Law Argument 
While we have not yet seen anyone or any organiza­
tion clearly articulate or formalize the argument for 
stricter laws in nanotechnology, as opposed to 
implying the argument, it can be characterized as the 
following: 
While more and more nanotechnology products are 
introduced into the marketplace, some studies have 
already suggested that engineered nanomaterials may 
be harmful, for instance, causing brain damage in 
animals [4]. As a specific example, the carbon 
nanotube – a nanomaterial that consists of carbon 
atoms precisely arranged, like connected Lego® 
blocks [5], and is estimated to be anywhere from 20 
to 100+ times stronger than steel of the same weight, 
with chemical bonds stronger than that found in 
diamonds – happens to resemble the whisker-like 
asbestos fiber. This is troubling because the shape of 
asbestos fibers is what makes them so difficult to 
dislodge from one’s lungs. Further, nanoparticles are 
so small, by definition, that they might easily and 
undetectably slip into a person’s body and cells to 
undetermined effects [6]. 
There are also unknown environmental impacts of 
nanomaterials. Because they are created to be more 
durable than existing materials, it begs the question of 
how long they will persist in our landfills [7]. If 
nanoparticles can be taken up by cells, as studies have 
shown, then they could slip into our food chain and 
eventually to us – which conjures up the related 
scenario of food poisoning from shellfish that had fed 
on toxic algae and other lessons in bioaccumulation, 
e.g., involving the pesticide DDT [8]. Again, the 
effects of nanoparticles on our biology are still 
unknown, so food poisoning may be the least of our 
worries, with genetic damage and death as other 
possibilities [9]. 
So the problem is this: for many people, it seems to 
be commonsensical that if there are real questions 
about the EHS impact of nanotechnology products or 
any other product, then we should investigate them 
further before these products enter our marketplace. 
Society has learned that from past lessons involving 
such hazardous products as asbestos or lead paint or 
DDT into the public space. 
Of course, there are laws and regulations already in 
place that – in theory – should prevent harmful 
products from ever reaching the marketplace, such as 
the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) and Occu­
pational Safety & Health Act (OSHAct) in the US. 
But are these laws really equipped to handle nano­
technology? We will not attempt to make that 
determination here, particularly given the comprehen­
sive analysis offered by the WWICS report and 
subsequently by other organizations [10], but we will 
point out that there is good-faith reason to believe that 
current laws are not perfect, which suggests a real 
possibility that they cannot account for the nano­
materials in question. 
Even if one doesn’t know much about the relevant 
laws, it is understood that laws are created based on 
the available facts and circumstances of the time and 
foreseeable future. They continue to evolve, be 
refined and even be repealed over time, as it should 
be. And given how little we know about nanotech­
nology – but that we know nanomaterials have novel 
and unpredictable properties – it would be difficult to 
see why we should expect current laws to not need 
updating (or an overhaul) as we learn more about 
nanotechnology. At any rate, it’s better to be safe than 
sorry, i.e., to be open to the possibility that we need 
stricter laws rather than to risk damaging our health 
and environment, or so the “stricter-law” argument 
goes. 
At this point, the argument would conclude that it 
must be a failure of current laws, such as those in the 
US, to prevent such products from entering the 
marketplace, since if there are serious and continuing 
questions about a product’s safety, then commonsense – 
or some version of the Precautionary Principle, which 
we will discuss later – would require the product is not 
released into the marketplace until its safety is more 
convincingly established. 
In the case of the 2006 WWICS report, the 
recommendation is to strengthen existing laws and 
regulations as well as to enact new ones. The report 
also provides an analysis of the legislation relevant to 
nanotechnology, including: the Toxic Substances 
Control Act, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and the major 
environmental laws such as Clean Air Act, and 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Again, in 
this paper, we will not look at that analysis to 
determine whether or not these acts really are 
equipped to deal with nanotechnology, but we will 
focus more on the supporting reasons behind the 
(implied) arguments to evaluate their soundness and 
consistency. 
Calling for stricter laws, of course, is not the only 
possible response to the alleged failure of current 
laws. Some have already proposed a moratorium or 
full ban on nanotechnology research and products 
until EHS risks are better understood and mitigated as 
needed [11]. We will also not investigate this 
particular position here, since if the argument for 
stricter laws cannot be defended, then it seems 
unlikely that an argument for a moratorium, which 
we take to be a significantly more extreme position, 
can also be defended. Further, the lack of support for 
a moratorium, other than from the few groups that 
have proposed it, may indicate that this position is an 
over-reaction, all things considered – again, so the 
stricter-law argument might go. 
Learning from History 
If the stricter-law argument sounds a bit far-fetched or 
paranoid, we can look at recent US history to see 
where our laws have failed us in protecting the public, 
including industry workers, from commercial hazards. 
There does not need to be an elaborate conspiracy 
theory that such laws had been poorly designed, 
perhaps as a result of misinformation, corporate 
influence or political haggling. Rather, it is a plain 
fact that people are fallible, both scientists and 
legislators alike, especially when it comes to predict­
ing the future – in this case about the adequacy of 
existing regulations to protect the public and the 
safety risk posed by new materials. 
Asbestos, lead paint and DDT are frequently-cited 
case studies, as well as diet drug “fen-phen” and other 
pharmaceuticals. In each case, these materials made 
their way into the marketplace and into our homes, 
only to be discovered later that they are hazardous to 
our health and/or environment. However, one can 
object that these incidents, having occurred years or 
decades ago, are an unfair comparison to today’s risk 
in nanotechnology. It may be offered in defense of 
current regulations that we have since evolved our 
laws and our thinking to more rigorously test new 
products, ever mindful to prevent such incidents from 
occurring again. 
But why should we believe the evolution of our 
product and environmental safety laws have reached 
an end point now? Are we really that clever as to have 
finally created a system of safeguards to protect us 
from every conceivable EHS risk? Rhetorical ques­
tions aside, the following is a current example of the 
apparent failure of EHS regulations in 2006 alone. 
Just last year, the US Environmental Protection 
Agency urged companies, including DuPont and 3M, 
to phase out their use of a chemical (Perfluoroocta­
noic Acid, or PFOA) used to make Teflon®, the non­
stick material found in everyday items such as 
cookware, carpeting, clothing, food packaging and 
thousands of other products [12]. In use for more than 
50 years, the chemical is linked to cancer and organ 
damage in laboratory animals. It is so ubiquitous in 
our environment that it is now found in the blood of 
nearly every American. One Teflon manufacturer has 
already paid more than $100 million to settle lawsuits 
from residents who live near its factory, including 
claims of birth defects. 
“The science on [Teflon] is still coming in, but the 
concern is there, so acting now to minimize future 
releases of PFOA is the right thing to do for our 
environment and health,” explained an EPA official 
[13]. Environmental watchdogs support the EPA 
move, explaining: “It would be hard to imagine a 
chemical that is more widespread in our environment. 
It is found everywhere from babies in the womb to 
whales in the ocean. And beyond that, it is indestruc­
tible in the environment. It lasts forever” [14]. 
So given this current and apparent failure of US 
regulations to discover or account for EHS risks posed 
by Teflon – never mind other continuing controversies, 
such as currently-available pharmaceutical drugs that 
might unknowingly cause severe health problems – a 
similar failure with respect to nanotechnology is not 
just possible but highly plausible. 
Of course, it is perhaps unreasonable to expect that 
we can guarantee that commercial products, particu­
larly emerging technologies, are completely safe. But 
it seems backwards to release a product into the 
marketplace and then conduct EHS testing needed to 
answer basic questions surrounding the product. For 
instance, there are continuing questions on whether 
mobile phones may cause a generation of people to 
have brain cancer, infertility or other health problems 
[15]. Also last year, a group in Finland announced 
that it is studying the effects of mobile phone 
radiation on human skin, given that previous tests 
have shown cellular shrinkage which may degrade 
our bodies’ ability to filter out toxins and other 
dangerous proteins [16]. 
As with Teflon, this is the exactly the kind of 
scenario that we want to avoid by now discussing 
regulation in nanotechnology. It would be a catastro­
phe on many levels if mobile phones are shown to be 
hazardous to our health, since we have already been 
using such devices for more than a decade. If they are 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
hazardous, we would hope that risk would have been 
caught by EHS processes designed to protect against 
this contingency. But since real, basic questions are 
still open surrounding mobile phones, as just one 
product, many suspect that EHS regulations today 
need to be repaired, independently of any special risks 
posed by nanomaterials. 
Returning to nanotechnology, the “commonsense” 
we referred to in constructing the argument above has 
been formally called the Precautionary Principle (PP), 
and it is worth discussing here briefly, since it plays a 
critical role in the argument. The PP, or at least one 
version of it, essentially states: if an action might 
possibly lead to an unacceptable consequence, then 
we should refrain from that action until that risk is 
mitigated [17]. 
As it applies here, the PP seems to dictate that if 
introducing nanotechnology products into the market­
place now might possibly lead to the unacceptable 
consequence of serious harm to people or the 
environment, then we should refrain from that action 
until that risk is mitigated – in this case, by 
implementing stronger laws and regulations. Note 
that for the PP to work, the risk needs to be credible 
and not just a bare or logical possibility. Given 
previous and ongoing research, it is a credible claim 
to say that, at best, we are uncertain whether nano­
materials are safe, and at worst, there is good 
evidence to show they are not. 
In the case of the Teflon chemical, even though 
studies have not definitively proven that it is harmful 
to humans in the amounts present in our everyday 
lives (otherwise a much stronger and immediate ban 
perhaps would have been proposed), there is enough 
data to suggest a real risk to the environment and our 
health. So the EPA seems to be guided by the PP or 
something similar in concluding that companies 
should produce less of this chemical, in case that its 
presence in consumer goods and in manufacturing 
emissions is truly harmful. In other words, the EPA 
decided that the best course of action is to err on the 
side of precaution, even though a $2 billion-a-year 
business is reputedly at stake [18]. 
Objections to the Stricter-Law Argument 
If we take the preceding as an accurate characteriza­
tion of the stricter-law argument, then we might 
(loosely) formalize the argument as the following set 
of premises (P) and conclusions (C): 
(P1)	 Some prima facie evidence exists that some 
engineered nanomaterials may be harmful to 
EHS interests. 
(P2)	 Current laws may be inadequate in accounting 
for EHS risks in nanotechnology (as a general 
liability of any law that is now relevant to an 
area that did not previously exist or was not 
properly/fully considered during the legislative 
or regulatory process). 
(C1)	 Therefore, there is a possibility that nanotech­
nology, as it advances and absent stricter laws, 
may lead to EHS harms. 
(P3)	 EHS harms are an unacceptable consequence, 
especially since our laws and some govern­
mental agencies exist specifically to protect us 
from those harms. 
(P4)	 Commonsense suggests we should adopt the 
Precautionary Principle in this case, which 
states that: if an action might possibly lead to 
an unacceptable consequence, then we should 
refrain from that action until that risk is 
mitigated. 
(C2)	 Therefore, we should refrain from allowing 
nanotechnology to proceed without taking 
some action to mitigate nanotech’s EHS risk. 
(P5)	 We can mitigate nanotech’s EHS risk by either 
enacting a moratorium or implementing stricter 
laws. 
(P6)	 A moratorium on nanotechnology research or 
commercialization has limited support and may 
be an over-reaction, so it is not a viable or 
reasonable option. 
(C3)	 Therefore, the action we should take, if we 
want nanotechnology to proceed, is to imple­
ment stricter laws. 
There has been much debate over the conclusion of 
the stricter-law argument. The objections, both actual 
and possible, to that argument include the following, 
in order of the weakest to strongest, as we see them: 
(a)	 Ordinary Material Objection: Nanomaterials are 
not any more harmful than other materials, so 
they need no special regulations; 
(b)	 Status Quo Objection: Current regulations are 
enough to safeguard the public from these 
harms; 
  
 
 
 
(c)	 Precautionary Principle Objection: The Precau­
tionary Principle should not apply here, so the 
entire argument that rests on it is flawed; 
(d)	 Self-regulation Objection: Self-regulation, not 
more governmental regulation, is the answer; 
(e)	 Other Harms Objection: Stricter regulation 
would stunt the growth of a nascent nanotech­
nology industry; 
(f)	 Future Harms Objection: More than the usual, 
near-term economic harms cited in (e), there may 
be more serious harms in the future if the 
nanotechnology industry were hindered now; and 
(g)	 Better-Us-Than-Them Objection: Increasing reg­
ulation only puts that nation at a disadvantage 
with others that may then develop and reap the 
benefits of nanotech first; 
Though some of these objections can be and have 
been combined, we will consider each separately in 
the following. The last few objections are the most 
compelling, so we will spend more time on those 
positions than others in our discussion. 
(a) Ordinary Materials Objection 
This objection asserts that existing laws and regu­
lations are adequate to account for nanotechnology, 
because nanomaterials are essentially the same kinds 
of substances that we have been using for decades. 
That is to say, a carbon nanotube is still only made up 
of carbon, and nano-sunblock is still only made up of 
zinc or titanium oxide – and these are materials that 
current regulations have proven sufficient to handle. 
In some cases, nanomaterials are simply much smaller 
versions of the familiar thing. In other cases, they are 
the same material with a different molecular arrange­
ment. Therefore, we do not need stricter laws to 
account for nanotechnology. 
In fact, nanotechnology is something that has 
arguably existed since the beginning of the world, if 
not earlier: “Nanostructures – objects with nanometer 
scale features – are not new nor were they first created 
by man. There are many examples of nanostructures 
in nature in the way that plants and animals have 
evolved. Similarly there are many natural nanoscale 
materials...catalysts, porous materials, certain miner­
als, soot particles, etc. that have unique properties 
particularly because of the nanoscale features” [19]. 
Analysis 
In the formalized argument stated above, this objec­
tion disputes either premise P1 or P2, or both, and 
therefore conclusion C1 as well as the dependent 
conclusions C2 and C3. However, the objection 
seems scientifically naive at best and contradictory 
at worst. First, it is precisely the different molecular 
arrangement of the same materials that creates 
different properties. In a certain arrangement, carbon 
can be made into pencil lead and useful for writing; in 
another arrangement, it is a diamond; in yet another, it 
is a carbon nanotube that, for example, is useful in 
building lighter cars or aircraft. Therefore, it is not so 
much the issue that nanotechnology works with 
common materials, but rather that by manipulating 
these materials at the nanoscale, we can create 
uncommon results – results that today’s laws and 
regulations could not have anticipated. 
Second, it is not just the molecular arrangement 
that gives nanomaterials their unique properties; it can 
also be their size. For instance, aluminum is often 
considered an everyday, safe element, e.g., soda cans 
are made from it. But if aluminum is ground up fine 
enough into dust, it can spontaneously combust in a 
highly energetic reaction with air. Further, nano­
particles are, by definition, so small that existing air 
and water filters would be unable to prevent their 
escape from manufacturing facilities – opening the 
possibility for toxic emissions that affect workers and 
the outside environment [20]. 
Given their size, nanomaterials may also be able to 
slip by current methods of testing for safety and 
health risks. In other words, current regulations that 
require such testing may not be enough, if the testing 
methods they require cannot catch nanosized materi­
als. Recognizing this challenge, researchers at UCLA, 
for instance, last year announced devising a new 
approach to nanotoxicology [21]. 
Finally, the Ordinary Materials Objection also 
seems to be a case of “wanting to have your cake 
and eat it too.” The allure of nanotechnology in the 
first place is that the materials we are creating have 
novel and useful properties that we are still trying to 
understand and exploit. So it would be inconsistent to 
say that these nanomaterials are nothing special that 
we need to worry about, when the entire point is that 
they are extraordinarily special. As something special 
and unpredictable, it would be reasonable to think that 
they might be more (or less) hazardous or toxic that 
ordinary materials of the same element or chemical – 
which is exactly the concern that is prompting calls 
for more regulation. 
(b) Status Quo Objection 
This objection to the stricter-law argument asserts that, as 
a matter of fact, current regulations are enough to 
safeguard the public from these harms. They have served 
us well over the years, and without definitive proof that 
nanomaterials are actually harmful in consumer products 
or manufacturing, it is premature to subject the nano­
technology industry to more regulations. 
Analysis 
This objection disputes premise P2 in our formalized 
argument, thereby throwing into question all con­
clusions from C1 to C3. Our evaluation of this 
objection has already been discussed in the preceding 
section, where we pointed out that today’s controver­
sy over Teflon, as just one example, shows that 
current laws and regulations are fallible and probably 
do not fully protect us from EHS risks in all consumer 
products or their manufacturing. 
Further, even if current laws are adequate to 
account for nanomaterials in production today and in 
the near future, the industry is still learning about the 
science and working on new materials, and these 
materials may slip past existing laws. Either way, it is 
also prudent to believe that the processes we have 
established to regulate business in general are 
imperfect and will continue to be a work in progress, 
as long as businesses and research organizations 
continue to innovate. Therefore, we should be open 
to the possibility that current laws and regulations are 
not enough, particularly when the consequences of 
their failure may be catastrophic. This objection, 
therefore, does not appear to be defensible against 
the stricter-law argument. 
(c) Precautionary Principle Objection 
This objection maintains that the Precautionary 
Principle (PP) is not an obviously-correct or com­
monsense rule that we should follow, and therefore 
the stricter-law argument falls apart, since it depends 
critically on the PP. The most serious criticism we 
examine here is that the PP represents a risk-averse 
strategy that is too conservative, at least as it applies 
to the considered case of nanotechnology where the 
EHS risk is still unclear [22]. 
Risk aversion, the argument goes, is not the only 
workable strategy in life, business or politics. After 
all, if Americans never took unnecessary or perhaps 
unreasonable risks, then we never would have 
accomplished such things as expanding the country 
westward to California, inventing the airplane and 
putting a man on the moon. In fact, America was built 
on the backs of explorers and frontiersman, such as 
Christopher Columbus and Captain John Smith, who 
risked and sometimes lost everything. And many 
other nations can say similar things about their 
forebearers, pioneers and inventors. 
Such may be the case with nanotechnology: it is a 
new frontier in science that, while admittedly contains 
unknown danger, also holds much promise. However, 
if we were to follow the PP, we may lose a great 
opportunity to develop a science that has been called 
“the Next Industrial Revolution” [23]. 
Analysis 
This objection attacks premise P4 in the formalized 
argument, evoking powerful emotions of national 
pride and adventure, so it may appeal to many. 
However, it is unfair to compare our current debate 
on strengthening laws relevant to nanotechnology 
with, say, the Wright Brothers’ debate on whether 
they should jump off a cliff on what amounts to a 
bicycle-powered deathtrap, or with any of the other 
situations cited above. 
One reason is that the individuals associated with 
above events, from Christopher Columbus’ crew to 
Neil Armstrong, presumably had consented to such 
risks. Their decisions more or less directly affected 
only their own lives. But in our considered debate 
surrounding nanotechnology, countless people may be 
put at risk without their consent. Indeed, surveys have 
shown that most Americans are unaware of what 
nanotechnology is or have not even heard the word 
before, so it would be impossible for them to give 
informed consent anyway, even if asked [24]. 
The issue of rights might be relevant here. Our 
basic human right to not be unjustifiably harmed 
plausibly entails a right to not have one’s life  
unjustifiably endangered or otherwise put at risk of 
significant harm. That is, not only are we morally 
barred from harming others without just cause, but we 
should also not put others at risk of such harm or even 
cause theoretical or statistical harm. Without their 
consent to be subjected to such risk, ignoring the PP 
in the case of nanotechnology may violate this right. 
Of course, one possible reply to this is that by 
participating in a democratic system such as that in the 
US, we are in effect “consenting” to the outcomes of 
elections, ballot propositions as well as any legal 
actions of the leaders we elect. So if an elected 
legislative body were to pass some measure or law 
that runs contrary to the PP, then it can be said that we 
had consented to such a decision by electing politicians 
prone to such aggressive policies. If current laws and 
regulations are allowed to stand as they are, that is a 
decision by which the public must abide (or seek to 
reverse through the established political channels). 
However, political theorists have pointed out that 
we cannot consent to unjustifiably lay down our lives 
or submit to unreasonable harms, since that would 
defeat the very purpose of government in the first 
place [25]. So extending this line of reasoning to our 
discussion here, it may be argued that we also cannot 
consent or countenance policies that lead to harm to 
our persons. 
At any rate, it does not seem unreasonable to 
suggest that if the stakes are high enough – as 
apparently is the case with nanotechnology, where real 
human and animal lives as well as the environment are 
at risk – then minimizing risk should be a guiding 
principle, rather than, say, the pursuit of profits, 
adventure or glory. Individual actors may arrive at a 
different conclusion, depending on their tolerance for 
risk and what value they place on their own welfare. 
But if the decision involves risking the welfare of 
countless others, it may be irresponsible to not adopt 
something like the Precautionary Principle – in which 
case the stricter-law argument again survives [26]. 
(d) Self-regulation Objection 
This position opposes more governmental regulation 
as a way to mitigate EHS risks. Rather, it advocates 
self-regulation as an alternative, such that if any 
additional regulation is needed, it should be left up to 
the industry to decide what measures are appropriate. 
There are several reasons why this view is 
attractive to many [27]. First, it promotes a smaller 
governmental footprint in business and individual 
lives, so it instantly appeals to libertarians and some 
conservatives. Also, it may make more sense for the 
nanotechnology industry, that presumably knows its 
field the better than lawmakers do and have a real 
stake in its work-processes, to devise and implement 
any regulations, rather than some distant bureaucracy 
whose edicts are inevitably borne from political 
compromise. By monitoring one’s own work, self-
regulation fosters a sense of responsibility within the 
industry. Further, self-regulation seems to work, as 
evidenced by any number of professional code of 
ethics. 
Analysis 
A persistent criticism to the idea of self-regulation is that 
it seems to let the proverbial fox guard the hen-house, or 
in other words, there is a sizable conflict of interest [28]. 
Can we trust an industry – any industry – to make its 
own rules when money is involved? Can they fairly 
create processes that protect EHS interests of the 
public, even at the expense of their own interests, 
financial or otherwise? 
Some have called it a pragmatic paradox to ask a 
person or organization to obey the law and, at the 
same time, be the law [29]. Because there is no real 
separation between those enforcing regulations and 
those subject to the regulations, the door seems to be 
open for self-imposed regulations to be selectively 
enforced and for potentially covering up illegal or 
unsafe practices. 
Of course, an enlightened company might see that 
it is in their best interest to deliver only safe products, 
since harming one’s own customers is counterproduc­
tive to one’s reputation and business as well as opens 
the company to possible litigation. But will every 
company arrive at the same conclusion, ignore short-
term gains for long-term interests and follow the 
rules? For self-regulation to work, nearly every 
industry actor needs to comply, since all it takes is 
one clever company to sidestep industry-imposed 
regulations for possible catastrophe to occur, i.e., the 
EHS risks may still exist and are not sufficiently 
mitigated by self-regulation. 
The diagnosis of why actors fail to cooperate even 
though it is in their better interests to do so – also 
known as a “Prisoners’ Dilemma” – is well covered in 
literature [30]. As groups such as OPEC have shown – 
whose members are notorious for ignoring their own 
self-imposed quotas for oil production, even though 
compliance gives them a means to control greater oil 
prices – it is a real challenge to get organizations to do 
what they have committed to, even if breaking that 
commitment will make them worse off in the long 
run. 
Further, if governmental regulations are believed to 
be imperfect because they contain political compro­
mise, it is unclear why matters should be different 
with self-regulation. An industry coalition is merely 
comprised of companies, research organizations and 
individuals of varying influence and interests – 
collectively representing a government of sorts, albeit 
a smaller and more direct model, with the same 
tendencies and weaknesses. 
In nanotechnology, the problem is worse, since there 
is no single “industry” that encompasses all the possible 
or even current applications in nanotechnology. Unlike 
associations for architects, engineers, lawyers or med­
ical doctor, there is no such group for nanotechnologists, 
because their work and interests are so varied – cutting 
across myriad industries and companies, from Applied 
Materials to BMW to L’Oreal to Merck to Zyvex and 
countless others. In fact, discussions about nanotech­
nology are usually prefaced with the disclaimer that 
“nanotechnology” itself is a misnomer and properly 
should be “nanotechnologies” to reflect the different 
lines of research and applications. 
Given the above concerns, it is not apparent that 
self-regulation is a more viable or desirable alternative 
to governmental regulation. Further, we should note 
that this objection does not dispute the soundness of 
the stricter-law argument: it agrees that something 
should be done to mitigate risk associated with 
nanotechnology. That is to say, it does not dispute 
any of the premises or logic in the formalized 
argument. It does not even dispute any of the 
conclusions, including C3 that mandates stricter laws; 
rather, the objection merely prefers self-regulation to 
governmental regulation. 
Even if the reasons given for self-regulation over 
governmental regulations are defensible, they appear 
irrelevant to attacking the stricter-law argument; 
therefore, the stricter-law argument survives this 
objection. At most, the objection might highlight the 
stricter-law argument, as formulated in this paper, as 
incomplete: further argument is needed to show that 
the stricter laws need to be mandated by government 
agencies as opposed to by an industry coalition, 
which would then be the point of attack for this 
objection. 
(e) Other Harms Objection 
This objection, perhaps the most popular of the seven 
considered, suggests that if stricter laws were im­
posed, there would be unacceptable costs or harms to 
the nanotechnology industry now. Few objectors have 
specified these costs, but we can imagine what some 
might be. If tougher regulation makes it more difficult 
for a nanotechnology product to be delivered to 
market, e.g. due to extended product testing cycles 
or more comprehensive environmental impact reports, 
then a business can reasonably expect to generate less 
revenue over a given period, since they no longer or 
won’t as quickly have that product on the shelves. 
This also means businesses might not be able to 
afford to keep the same number of researchers or 
other employees on staff, leading to a loss of jobs. 
Without as many active researchers – including those 
in academic or other non-business labs, to the extent 
that these new laws affect their work – nanotechnol­
ogy will not advance as quickly as it might otherwise 
have. And if other nations do not have the same 
stringent restrictions that we do, the US may suffer a 
real competitive disadvantage globally. (We will 
discuss other potential costs later, but these seem to 
be the primary ones associated with this objection.) 
Indeed, a recent report from Cientifica argues that 
today, even without the stronger regulations proposed, 
the pace of funding, research and development in the 
US is not fast enough to sustain business efforts and 
compete with other nations [31]. The report warns 
that not enough government spending in nanotech­
nology is focused on areas of immediate commercial 
impact. And accessing this funding is a slow process, 
taking an average of 2 to 3 years before it even 
reaches the lab. The report also finds that, as a 
proportion of its gross domestic product, the Japanese 
government spends three times as much on the 
technology than the US does. As it applies to the 
Other Harms Objection, this report would lend 
defense to the claim that the nanotechnology industry 
needs more support, not more hurdles that would slow 
it down further. 
Analysis 
This objection disputes premise P3 in our formalized 
argument above. By itself, it does not deny that there 
may be EHS harms from nanotechnology (i.e., it does 
not dispute conclusion C1), but it asserts that EHS 
harms are not an unacceptable consequence if stricter 
laws would cause greater harm, thereby questioning 
conclusions C2 and C3. 
The objection – that an action will have burdens 
on the business side – is a common response to 
nearly any proposal to introduce new tax or 
regulations. For instance, a higher minimum wage 
would mean that some businesses will need to spend 
more on payroll and perhaps pass along that expense 
to customers in higher prices. And considering that 
some of these companies might be barely profitable, 
it seems reasonable to predict that some may go out 
of business. They simply cannot afford to spend 
more, without somehow increasing revenue – and if 
they knew how to do that, they probably would have 
done it already. (Though even in hindsight, it is not 
clear how many, if any, legitimate businesses have 
closed as a direct result of paying a higher minimum 
wage.) 
But a loss of jobs and revenue by itself is not 
necessarily a bad thing, if there are other redeeming 
results. For instance, even if nanotechnology products 
were allowed to reach the marketplace unhindered by 
new or strengthened laws, their success would 
inescapably cause other sectors and companies to 
lose jobs, just as word processing software displaced 
workers in the typewriter industry. A nano-paint 
company whose products are more durable and 
scratch resistant than traditional paint may likewise 
displace competitors, so a loss of jobs and revenue by 
somebody may be unavoidable. This is an illustration 
of “economic Darwinism”, presumably a desirable 
situation where new, better innovations and busi­
nesses replace older, less efficient or less effective 
ones. In the nanotechnology regulation debate, the 
economic harms potentially caused by stricter nano­
technology laws may be offset by the lives, animal 
and human, that the stricter laws potentially save. 
So while we can empathize with the Other Harms 
Objection, it appears to be one-sided and ignores the 
fact that there must be a tradeoff. Every proposal has 
its costs, and there seems to a necessary downside for 
somebody. But there is also an upside or benefits too; 
otherwise, the proposal would have not been worth 
making in the first place, even if there were no costs. 
The challenge is not just to identify these costs, but 
also to evaluate the costs and benefits to determine 
whether the proposal is worthwhile overall. 
For instance, we know that for every bridge or 
skyscraper that is built, a certain number of construc­
tion workers can be expected to die or be seriously 
injured on that job. This is not a trivial concern – but 
should it be enough to derail a bridge or skyscraper 
project? We loathe to put a price tag on a person’s 
life, such as in making a cold, utilitarian calculation of 
lives lost versus economic benefits from the bridge. 
But the fact is that such calculations must happen in 
real-world projects. 
As it applies to the issue at hand, the benefit of 
stricter regulations is that we reduce the risk that 
nanotechnology may pose to the public, industry 
workers and the environment. Does reducing that risk 
justify the potential loss of profit, jobs and compet­
itive advantage in the nanotechnology industry? 
Finding the answer to this question depends on 
additional considerations: How much would these 
new regulations reduce the risk – a substantial or an 
incremental amount? How much burden exactly 
would these regulations put on the industry? If we 
could quantify likely and worst-case scenarios, how 
many consumers might be harmed – and what kind of 
harm – without new regulations, and how much 
would the industry lose in jobs and profits? These are 
questions that will require more research to answer, 
although a common intuition might be that people 
should be valued more than profits, no matter how 
much is at stake for an industry – a point we will not 
take up in this paper. 
However, matters can quickly become more com­
plicated without debating that point, when one 
considers the role of rights in this discussion. If we 
have a basic human right not to be unjustifiable 
harmed and the government has an obligation to 
protect its citizens (from internal and external threats, 
including unsafe commercial products), then it seems 
that stricter regulations are needed to protect this right 
and fulfill the government’s obligation. 
But on the business side, it is less clear what rights 
would be violated by the introduction of stronger laws. 
Do we have a right to the jobs that might be lost in 
nanotechnology? Do businesses have a right to develop 
products that are in compliance with existing laws (or is 
there a corporate moral responsibility to employees and 
customers, beyond what is required by law)? 
Even if we answer “yes” to these questions and 
others, it may be useful to note the types of rights at 
stake. Our individual right to not be unjustifiably 
harmed is a “negative” right, meaning that it requires 
others from not interfering from an action [32]. But 
any business-related rights seem to be “positive” rights 
in that they require some good or service to be 
provided [33]. As other examples, our right to free 
speech is a negative right, since it requires that others 
refrain from preventing us to speak our minds. In 
contrast, our right to education is a positive right, since 
it requires that we are provided with access to learning. 
The relevance of this distinction is that negative 
rights, it has been argued, are stronger than positive 
rights [34]. Negative rights can be observed by, for 
instance, simply not interfering with someone else’s 
speech or not harming a person unjustifiably; no 
action is needed. But positive rights are more difficult 
to respect, since they require an action or series of 
actions that may take some effort, for instance, hiring 
teachers and building classrooms in order to provide a 
public system of education. Because negative rights 
take less effort to respect, it is less forgivable to 
violate a negative right [35]. 
So even if the jury is still out on whether the cost to 
business and industry is really worth the reduction in 
EHS risk from stricter laws, there seems to be prima 
facie reason to favor stricter laws on grounds that it 
protects our negative right to not be harmed, which 
must take precedent over any positive rights of the 
nanotechnology industry – and it is not even clear what 
rights are at stake in business and industry. Another 
prima facie reason for some individuals may be based 
on the aforementioned “people over profits” intuition. 
We should note that the Other Harms Objection, by 
itself, does not dispute the soundness or logic of the 
stricter-law argument. Rather, it attempts to show that 
P3 should not be accepted by shifting the focus to a 
contest between benefits and harms, suggesting that 
more damage than good will be caused by stricter 
laws – which we are taking here to be, at best, an 
open question or stalemate. Therefore, in our analysis, 
the stricter-law argument appears to survive this 
objection for the time being. 
Further, we should also note here that the Self-
regulation Objection and the Other Harms Objection 
are incompatible, i.e., it is logically inconsistent to 
hold that stricter regulation would hinder a fledgling 
nanotechnology industry and that self-regulation is 
the answer. Any self-imposed regulations nevertheless 
represent more regulations than which currently 
exists. But if it also believed that more regulation 
would stunt industry growth, then self-regulation too 
must impede industry progress – unless self-regulat­
ing is a hollow or token gesture to appease regulators 
and the concerned public. 
(f) Future Harms Objection 
If there is something reasonable, but not completely 
convincing, about the Other Harms Objection, then 
we can perhaps strengthen it here by pushing its time-
horizon farther out, giving the argument more 
consideration [36]. In doing so, we can suggest that 
the preceding objection really did not consider 
enough harms: it looked only at immediate or short-
term harms associated with stricter laws. But nano­
technology is something that is forecasted to give 
humanity profound benefits once it matures, and we 
have yet to consider those goals in pursuing nano­
technology. If we slow the industry down today, will 
that prevent or hinder us from realizing these benefits 
later – benefits that may plausibly outweigh EHS 
risks that exist either today or in the future? 
In the following, we will briefly present some of 
the risks of moving too slowly in nanotechnology that 
could be advanced by the Future Harms Objection, 
which is not an objection we commonly see but is a 
view held or implied by at least some nanotechnology 
advocates. Taken together, these risks raise the stakes 
involved in the stricter-law debate and may present a 
more compelling challenge. 
Economic Benefits 
Nanotechnology is predicted to be a trillion-dollar 
industry by 2015 [37]. While other countries – 
including Brazil, China, South Korea, India, Israel, 
Russia and many European nations – proceed at full 
speed ahead, the US and any other nation may lose 
significant economic benefits if it is not among the 
leaders in nanotechnology. Depending on the scale of 
economic benefits a nanotechnology industry or 
industries can provide, many lives in the US may be 
saved or made better, given that poverty is one of the 
greatest determinant of life expectancy. Further, the 
jobs that stricter US laws might deprive might not 
simply be as a result of preventing new lines of 
business from being created, but those are jobs that 
now might be lost overseas, if another country or 
countries take the lead and develop those commercial 
innovations. 
So the problem is that, while the US may pride 
itself for being democratic in recognizing and consid­
ering various interests among its population, from 
business owners to environmentalists, other govern­
ments may not be constrained by this guiding 
principle and can push nanotechnology research and 
products ahead, unencumbered by laws and regula­
tions that may be stricter in the US. This may lead to 
a loss of economic benefits on a larger scale than 
previously considered, since in this scenario, jump-
starting the nanotechnology products industry then 
would take more than firing the research and 
manufacturing facilities back up; we would then need 
to play catch-up in competing with other nations who 
may have a significant, potentially insurmountable, 
head start. 
Military Implications 
Nanotechnology promises to have significant military 
applications, and indeed the military is a key driver of 
nanotechnology research for many nations, including 
the US. These predicted innovations include new 
offensive capabilities (such as energy, robotic and 
stealth weapons) and defensive (such as stronger 
armor and better detection and jamming capabilities). 
The military is also leading the charge to develop 
medical advances that can be used on the battlefield 
and better information systems used for intelligence 
gathering as well as control and command centers. 
With nanotechnology, production speed of military 
assets can be increased to give a sizable advantage in 
numbers alone, let alone their efficiency. 
Nanotechnology, then, has the potential to take a 
military force into the next generation and beyond. 
And to the extent that a balance of military powers 
around the  world is needed to maintain some  
semblance of global security or peace, nanotechnol­
ogy could disrupt this balance, if it is developed 
unevenly by current military powers. Never mind 
how a nation would feel to lose its position or 
influence in global affairs, a more worrisome question 
to many is: what would be the effect of a non­
democratic government having the most advanced 
nanotechnology capabilities or developing them first? 
Would that subject the nation to a foreign attack that 
cannot be answered in kind? The potential loss of 
security and lives needs to be added to the list of 
harms, if stricter laws are also applied to or affect 
military developments. 
Reversing Environmental and Health Risks 
The current debate over stricter laws is grounded in 
concerns that nanotechnology products today may be 
harmful to the environment and our health. But it is 
also important to note that nanotechnology is also 
expected to enable us to reverse many conditions that 
afflict our environment and health. Nanotechnology is 
being applied, for instance, to create better filters that 
can provide clean water and air, which can help Third 
World countries that need it the most. 
Likewise, it can help ameliorate the large environ­
mental impact of dirty industrial processes, including 
those having to do with energy generation. New and 
additional sources of energy, such as cost-effective 
solar energy, will reduce or eliminate pressure on 
current natural resources. Chevron recently an­
nounced working on nanotechnology that can convert 
tar found in sand into useable oil, which would serve 
a dual purpose of cleaning up the environment [38]. 
In the distant future, nanotechnology may be able to 
rebuild our depleting ozone layer or create nanobots 
that can “eat” oil spills and other contaminants. 
Beyond environmental benefits, nanotechnology is 
being applied to agriculture to better feed the hungry 
and to medicine to save more lives. So if we are 
worried today about EHS risks in nanotechnology 
products, we should also keep in mind the EHS risks 
they could mitigate or solve with a sufficient time 
horizon, including today’s risks. 
Analysis 
This objection is more robust that the preceding one 
for a number of reasons. First, it adds longer-term 
benefits (or harms from not pursuing nanotech) to the 
list of those that should be considered for a more 
complete picture of nanotechnology’s social and 
economic impact. This, in turn, lends support to the 
Precautionary Principle Objection: given these other 
considerations, risk aversion seems less to be a 
reasonable strategy, to the extent that potential 
benefits seem to far outweigh potential harms in 
aggressively pursuing nanotechnology. 
But if this is such a compelling argument, why do 
we not see more people (explicitly) advance it? One 
reason seems to be that this sort of objection requires 
making mid- and far-term speculations about nano­
technology, which is always risky business, especially 
if it also raises other ethical and societal concerns. For 
instance, nanotechnology’s role in the military might 
resurrect questions from the Cold War about mutually-
assured destruction and first-strikes. And many of the 
more interesting predictions about nanotechnology 
revolve around “molecular manufacturing” – an 
advanced form of nanotechnology that involves 
building designer objects one molecule at a time, 
raising the possibility of creating virtually any object 
we want, from food to weapons; however, this is very 
much an area that many or most mainstream scientists 
are reluctant to speculate about or openly dismiss 
[39]. And if molecular manufacturing were more 
widely predicted to be plausible, it may open a 
Pandora’s Box of potentially disruptive and harmful 
effects on global trade and therefore politics, all 
complex questions that would then need to be 
addressed. Again, all this is speculative, so it is 
unclear what the possible far-term harms are and their 
probability, even if we are confident about far-term 
benefits. 
The Future Harms Objection also forces us to 
confront the unpleasant question of what the limits are 
to our right not to be unjustifiably harmed: is it 
morally permissible to risk the health of, say, 1,000 or 
even 10,000 manufacturing workers and consumers 
today, if we can save 100,000 or 1,000,000 other lives 
later through the aggressive pursuit of nanotechnolo­
gy? (These numbers, of course, are very difficult to 
forecast and are used merely as examples here.) Also, 
speaking of future generations, if federal funding is a 
zero-sum game, i.e., funding nanotechnology now 
takes away from the budget in another area, what 
about lives today that could have been saved with the 
funding currently diverted to nanotechnology, which 
is more an investment in tomorrow? These are 
questions that have no simple or universally-accepted 
answer, much less one that a legislator would want to 
tackle. 
As such, this particular objection, as with the Other 
Harms Objections, again depends on other factors, 
namely rights, that cannot easily be reconciled on an 
accounting ledger of benefits versus harms. So if we 
are to extend the time horizon in the Other Harms 
Objection to make the Future Harms Objection, then 
it seems only fair that we must consider long-term 
harms of not having stricter laws as well – again, 
leading us back to a probable stalemate in the debate. 
Though the Future Harms Objection appears to be 
stronger than its predecessor, the numbers involved 
are too difficult to quantify and forecast, as well as 
difficult to process in the framework of human rights. 
Further, though this objection is related to the Other 
Harms Objection, the objectors seem to represent very 
different positions: to the extent that mainstream 
scientists and nanotechnology executives support the 
Other Harms Objection, they may be reluctant to 
speculate about nanotechnology’s promise beyond the 
near future, fragmenting support for the Future Harms 
Objection. 
Of course, none of this speaks to the objection’s 
soundness or logic. If we can reasonably project 
overall benefits and harms across time, and if the 
benefits sufficiently outweigh the harms, and if the 
relevant human rights are not unjustifiably violated, 
then the Future Harms Objection could be defensible. 
But these variables are perhaps too speculative to nail 
down with much confidence; therefore, the premise 
P3 that it was designed to attack seems to survive, or 
at least it has not been convincingly shown that it 
should be rejected. 
(g) Better-Us-Than-Them Objection 
The final objection we will consider in this paper is 
not one we see explicitly in nanotechnology-related 
literature, but it is one we have heard anecdotally. It 
might start by pointing out that many democratic 
nations, such as the US, occupy a fortunate position in 
the world where they can afford to be reflective about 
matters of ethics and philosophy. We have that luxury, 
but many other countries do not; they are embroiled 
in a more desperate fight for survival. And if the 
means became – and at some point will become – 
available to them, chances are good that they will 
pursue and exploit nanotechnology without such strict 
regulations, if any regulations at all, to impede 
research and development, perhaps for the base 
reasons of national glory or military superiority and 
even at the expense of their own citizens and 
environment. 
Do we really want nanotechnology to be dominat­
ed by other nations of whom we are already 
suspicious? Even if we can take the higher moral 
ground and lay aside our national prejudices, it does 
not change the fact that the other country will 
probably not – and not care. Imagine then how the 
world and beyond might look, if that foreign country 
were to be the ones who control nanotechnology, 
which could be the key to controlling literally 
everything. 
So if not only for this reason, we must keep our 
lead in developing nanotechnology; we don’t want to 
live on Planet Kim Jong-il. For the same reason, even 
if we think our nano-future is bleak anyway, it could 
be worse if the wrong nations were to be the ones 
who shaped it the most. 
So we must “own” nanotechnology and proceed 
full speed ahead, without stricter regulations to 
impede us; and when we do, we can take a rest and 
become reflective again, returning our attention to 
EHS matters. By deferring that moment of moral 
questioning from now to then, we would then be in a 
time and a place when we can do something about our 
angst and any harm previously caused. We can give 
nanotechnology to other countries, if we’re so 
concerned about justly distributing tools that can help 
humanity. We can try then to build that utopia we had 
only read about. Even if we can’t do any of this, this 
possible world seems much nicer that the one where, 
say, a non-democratic country had its way with the 
world, to the extent that our utopia is more utopian 
and our values more valuable (to us at least). 
That’s why we – and by “we”, I mean your 
respective nation – need to dominate nanotechnology 
research, even if some problems are caused along the 
way, which appear to be smaller problems within a 
much larger picture. Now, this is not the ideal 
scenario, but it is a rationale one. We would rather 
not be in a dangerous competition with another 
country or countries; but the fact remains that we 
are. And that’s the difference between philosophy 
ethics and real-world ethics. Or so this objection 
might go. 
Analysis 
As with the previous two objections, this one disputes 
premise P3 in our formalized argument. It does not 
deny that there may be EHS harms from nanotech­
nology (i.e., it does not dispute conclusion C1), but it 
asserts that EHS harms are not an unacceptable 
consequence if stricter laws would cause greater 
harm, thereby questioning conclusions C2 and C3. 
In fact, it argues that greater harm would be caused by 
not aggressively pursuing nanotechnology and allow­
ing other nations to take the lead; therefore, EHS 
harms are the lesser of two evils and should be 
preferred and accepted over the alternative. 
This is a very pragmatic – and forgivable – 
position to take on the role of ethics in society and 
especially in a democracy. But where risk-aversion 
may not always be the best strategy as the previous 
objection asserted, being pragmatic also might not be 
the best course of action or the right thing to do. 
For instance, consider the ban on human cloning 
that exists in some countries. It would be pragmatic to 
argue that at some point, somewhere in the world, 
someone will clone a human being. If this is an 
inevitable event, then it would be better if we (our 
nation) were the ones who cloned a human first; we 
could at least ensure that safeguards were in place, 
that the clone could be treated humanely, that we 
would put any knowledge we gained to good use, etc. 
But if this line of reasoning fails to work in human 
cloning (as well as other cases such as an arms build­
up), then it seems to suffer from the same condition 
when applied to nanotechnology. 
Further, as we discussed in the previous two 
objections, this objection ignores the role of human 
rights, the rights of citizens today to not be harmed; or 
it at least is willing to sacrifice these rights for a future 
benefit, which is a controversial position to adopt. 
Finally, there is no guarantee or even reasonable 
assurance that if we pursue nanotechnology without 
restriction, then our nation will have the lead; it is 
very much still an open field. So without some 
safeguards in place at the national level if not also 
globally (such as treaties to limit the threat of 
mutually-assured destruction, in the case of an arms 
build-up), there is still potential for catastrophe to 
occur, especially if we move forward recklessly. And 
a more sensible or alternative solution to the situation 
posited by the objection seems to be that we should 
advocate greater regulations and oversight – or at 
least cooperation as a first step – on a global scale, if 
stricter regulations only at the national scale would 
impede that particular nation. 
The belief that something is inevitable, whether 
nanotechnology or Armageddon, does not seem to be 
a good enough reason to rush towards it, especially if 
we can buy some time by moving a bit slower – 
precious time needed to perhaps develop safeguards 
to mitigate any associated negative impacts. 
An Interim Solution? 
A full defense or analysis of the preceding objections, 
particularly the last three, is beyond the scope and 
goals of this paper, but there seems to be enough 
reason to believe that they are not entirely without 
merit. At the same time, there does not (yet) seem to 
be enough there to believe that the stricter-law 
argument should be rejected. So an interim or 
compromise solution may be needed now to cover 
both contingencies. 
Moreover, even if stricter laws and regulations are 
ultimately justified, there are good reasons to think 
that they cannot be enacted anyway, or at least face 
stiff resistance with lawmakers and regulatory agen­
cies, particularly in the US. Clarence Davies, the 
author of the Woodrow Wilson International Center 
report that sparked today’s stricter-law debate, even 
admits that: “In the U.S. political system, it has never 
been easy to pass new laws regulating commercial 
products. In the current political climate, it is close to 
impossible” [40]. Changing regulatory policy is 
likewise a formidable challenge. 
That is to say, the US legislative and regulatory 
systems are notorious for being complicated and 
mired in debate, so barring an urgent need – which 
many believe has not yet been established for nano­
materials – it does not seem optimistic to think that 
new laws or stronger regulations can be enacted in the 
near future, even if needed. But perhaps we can 
suggest a simpler solution here. 
Running Faster to Catch Up 
There is a sense with many that nanomaterials found 
in today’s products have not been established yet as a 
clear and present danger, which may be part of public, 
legislative and regulatory hesitation to propose dra­
matic changes to current rules. Under this reasoning, 
rushing new laws or regulations through until more 
facts are revealed may be the same kind of mistake as 
rushing nanotechnology products into the marketplace 
without fully considering their impact on health, 
environment or even society and ethics. 
But we can acknowledge this position while at the 
same time be prepared to adopt new regulations if and 
when more studies show that nanomaterials are 
indeed harmful and that new laws are warranted. 
That is to say, even if we are not ready to call for 
stricter policies now, we can and perhaps should have 
a contingency plan or “Plan B” developed, discussed 
and ready to be implemented, should more compel­
ling evidence be presented in favor of stricter laws. 
(The trick here, of course, is to specify the details of 
such a “Plan B”, which too is beyond the scope and 
goals of this paper.) If we adopt a wait-and-see 
attitude towards nanomaterials, then it is incumbent 
upon us to aggressively conduct safety testing. 
However, a critical point in the nanotechnology 
regulatory debate is that current testing methods may 
be inadequate against nanomaterials and products, so 
it is not clear that more testing will get us far if we do 
not improve those methods; therefore, it is also 
incumbent upon us to aggressively develop new 
testing methods in order to conduct EHS testing 
effectively. 
The proposed solution, then, is rather than slowing 
the nanotechnology industry down through more 
regulations, as some claim they would, regulatory 
planning as well as EHS testing and research need to 
run faster and catch up – just as experts have called 
upon ethics to do [41]. Starting a serious dialogue 
today with policymakers would help compensate for 
the slow time-to-action for creating new laws, 
particularly if we are just idly waiting for more 
research to come out that would compel action. And 
continuing to support and fund research into nano­
material safety is critical to evolve the safety stan­
dards that exist in current laws and regulations. 
Progress is being made in this area, as the aforemen­
tioned UCLA researchers last year, and others since 
then, showed by developing a new testing model to 
evaluate the safety and health risks of engineered 
nanomaterials. 
Further, if we can improve testing methods, then 
we may not need new laws or stronger regulations, at 
least in the meantime. Where current laws and 
regulations require materials to pass certain safety 
and health standards, we may be able to simply 
evolve and raise those standards as scientific under­
standing and testing methods evolve, as opposed to 
erecting new regulations. This would only require that 
current policies recognize and utilize the latest 
advances in safety and health testing, which is a 
reasonable expectation. (Note: The WWICS report 
criticizes some of the relevant regulations as being 
unclear or having loopholes or failing to apply to 
critical industries, such as cosmetics, so improved 
materials testing admittedly would not solve those 
deficiencies. However, those problems exist indepen­
dently from nanotechnology: they are not specific to 
nanomaterials and have been issues for some time 
now. As such, they present a broader challenge in the 
field of a regulatory reform and therefore are not so 
much addressed in our discussion here.) 
Without developing new testing methods, it does 
not seem that new or stricter laws can address risks 
posed by nanomaterials anyway, if current methods 
fail us. Therefore, incorporating these new standards 
is the salient point in the recommendation to create 
stricter laws and regulations. Or to put it another way, 
if current testing methods are inadequate to show that 
nanomaterials are harmful, and we know that they are 
harmful at least in some cases, then any new or 
stronger law that is still based on these current 
methods does not seem to add much value, just more 
barriers to business. 
For instance, would harsher civil and criminal 
penalties or more detailed environmental impact 
reports cause company executives to act any differ­
ently, if no different methods were available to 
support or refute previous claims of product and 
materials safety? They would most likely run more of 
the same tests to arrive at the same conclusion. This 
would seem to be an instance of GIGO or “garbage­
in-garbage-out”, where without new testing methods, 
we are using inadequate processes that inevitably 
generate inadequate conclusions. 
If it makes sense to push harder for better testing 
methods, that still leaves a problem of a stop-gap 
measure in the meantime, since new funding takes a 
significant amount of time to disburse and research 
often proceeds slowly as well. One solution is to 
accept the proposal for the nanotechnology industry 
to regulate itself, as an alternative to doing nothing. 
To repeat a key point in our discussion of the Self-
regulation Objection above, the objection itself does 
not dispute the soundness of the stricter-law argu­
ment. In fact, it agrees that more regulations are 
needed, but that the nanotechnology industry should 
be the one to create and implement them, since the 
industry knows nanotechnology the best and has a 
direct interest in sustaining the field. 
At best, self-regulation will eliminate EHS risks in 
nanotechnology to at least some degree; at worst, it 
seems that it would not create any additional EHS 
risks but at least represents a good-faith effort to 
mitigate those risks. If and when governmental 
regulations are needed, that process can be informed 
by the prior exercise of self-regulation. 
Open Questions 
Of course, the interim solution proposed above is a 
conceptual framework, and many real-world details 
still need to be worked out. For instance, are there any 
examples of “Plan B” approaches to suggest that such 
a proposal can actually work? What are the specific 
steps we would need to take to strengthen pre-
regulatory planning, methods for testing materials, 
and toxicology testing? Do we need (paradoxically) a 
legal basis for ensuring that this greater focus on EHS 
risks and testing actually occurs, for example, by 
stipulating that some percentage of all nanotechnolo­
gy research funds will go towards these areas? 
How do we know that more and faster study of the 
EHS aspects of nanotechnology can keep up with the 
full-throttle research and development (R&D) and 
commercialization of nanotechnology in not just the 
US but also abroad? And how much more funding is 
needed for ethics and risk to catch up with R&D? If 
other nations do not focus as much on EHS risks, 
would the US (or any other nation that adopts such an 
interim solution) need to compensate with even more 
funding, given that nanotechnology ultimately knows 
no national boundaries and impacts the entire world, 
especially given a global economic ecosystem? 
And if additional funding is warranted, where 
would that come from? Would it be diverted from 
other programs that are working on current cures for 
current ills, outside of nanotechnology’s risks (which 
seem to be future risks, as opposed to actually 
harming people or the environment right now)? 
These are all good questions, and we do not intend 
to present a complete solution here; but we merely 
hope to provide a starting point for discussion 
towards a feasible solution while the nanotechnology 
regulation debate rages on. Moreover, to the extent 
that nanotechnology is a highly interdisciplinary area, 
we would expect that collaboration among law­
makers, scientists, ethicists, economists, and so on 
would be needed to account for the complicated 
issues arising from nanotechnology – more than just 
what a few ethicists can achieve here. 
Conclusion 
Though we would like to avoid the difficult compar­
ison of nanotechnology’s possible benefits with its 
possible harms in this paper, it seems that what is 
known now – and not just speculation, albeit educated – 
is that nanotechnology products today provide only 
incremental value or changes to existing products, i.e., 
they represent “better mousetraps” and not yet the 
revolutionary products predicted. On the other hand, the 
risks that nanomaterials pose today may be severe, 
possibly including death of animals and people. 
Therefore, we conclude that there is reason to think 
that current laws do not fully account for nanotech­
nology, if potentially-hazardous nanotechnology 
products are reaching the marketplace. Nanotechnol­
ogy, though technically not a “new” science, never­
theless introduces new materials that may defy current 
testing and safety standards not designed with nano­
sized particles in mind. And research already indi­
cates that nanomaterials are hazardous to the 
environment and human health, which is made all 
the more troubling considering that some nanomate­
rials come into direct contact with human beings, 
such as that in sunblock rubbed into one’s skin. 
But here’s an important caveat: even if current laws 
are inadequate, would new or stronger laws be 
enough to fill that gap? In other words, the regulatory 
debate has been centered on the question of whether 
we need more regulation; but the more relevant 
question may be, why are current laws ill-equipped 
to deal with nanotechnology? The answer, or at least 
the complete answer, might not be that we are missing 
some law or process, but that the testing methods and 
standards built into existing laws have not caught up 
with the pace of nanotechnology. 
While cleaning up and streamlining our maze of 
regulatory processes would certainly be helpful in 
general, unless we can quickly advance methods to 
more effectively test for environmental, health and 
safety risks in nanomaterials, new or stricter laws 
may serve to only slow down the industry through 
procedural changes rather than to improve our 
evaluation of nanomaterials through substantive or 
qualitative changes in how we approach such 
materials. 
So our suggestion is, rather than causing the 
nanotechnology industry and business to slow down 
now – which risks being a knee-jerk reaction to create 
more laws in the face of a problem – other areas can 
be stimulated to quickly catch up. Regulatory pre-
planning needs to catch up with the growing number 
of studies that confirm nanotechnology’s EHS risks, 
in case new laws are ultimately needed. And testing 
methods and standards need to catch up to better 
confirm the safety of nanomaterials, which could 
occur within the framework of existing laws, and 
screen out the products that are hazardous to our 
environment, health and safety. At the same time, we 
can take the nanotechnology industry up on its offer 
to regulate itself; there does not seem to be any harm 
in that, especially if the alternative is to do nothing. 
There are several advantages of such a solution. 
First, while benefits today in nanotechnology (i.e., 
better sunblock, better sports equipment, better pants, 
etc.) might not justify its risks, this might not remain 
the case in the future. And overburdening the 
nanotechnology industry with regulation, though well 
intended, may ultimately cause more damage than 
good. So we need to find a reasonable balance that 
responsibly promotes innovation in nanotechnology 
while at the same time safeguards EHS interests – in 
addition to other interests that nanotechnology may 
run up against as the field matures, such as privacy. 
Second, a compromise may be needed anyway, 
once we recognize that there are significant chal­
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
lenges in creating new laws or regulations, and that 
there is presently little public awareness of these 
issues that might apply pressure to policymakers. 
Neither business interests nor EHS interests will be 
going away any time soon, nor do we really want 
either to. But we have seen the undesirable effects of 
placing too much focus on either business or EHS, so 
finding a balance between these legitimate interests is 
needed, particularly in a democracy that values a 
diversity of opinions. 
Third, such a solution may serve to accelerate the 
industry responsibly – giving us new confidence that 
our nanoproducts are safe or identifying the ones that 
are not. Research into new testing methods would 
also give us new insights into nanomaterials, perhaps 
even new applications. 
In Greek mythology, Prometheus – the titan of 
forethought – gave fire to mankind as a gift (though 
he was summarily punished by the gods with 
unending torture). In nanotechnology, we also have 
a rare gift that can enable us to profoundly change our 
world. But just as we should not play with fire before 
we learn how to control it or its risks, commonsense 
requires the same for nanotechnology. With more 
effective regulations and new safety testing methods, 
we can help ensure that nanotechnology does not burn 
our world down. 
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